Imaginative Solutions II: The Wrath of Ahmadinejad

In the latest episode of foreign policy wonks spinning their wheels in Iranian quicksand, Dennis Ross wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post, wondering what would happen . . .

"... if we could threaten collective sanctions that the Iranians would see as biting? What if those were combined with possible gains in terms of a deal on nuclear energy, economic benefits and security understandings if the Iranians would give up the nuclear program?"

Genius. The stick and the carrot. Why didn't anyone think of this before?

I didn't really bring up Ross for his astonishingly stale proposal. I brought him up because in his essay, he reiterates two propositions that have become conventional wisdom on a nuclear Iran. Unfortunately - or fortunately - the conventional wisdom here is wrong.

Let's start with the first proposition, what you might call a middle east 'domino theory' if Iran becomes nuclear:

"The Saudis -- fearing an emboldened Iran determined to coerce others and to promote Shiite subversion in the Arabian Peninsula -- will seek their own nuclear capability, and probably already have a deal with Pakistan to provide it should Iran pose this kind of threat. And don't expect Egypt to be content with Saudi Arabia's being the only Arab country with a nuclear 'deterrent.'"

This prediction - there isn't enough to call an analysis - is incorrect for many reasons. Unlike Saddam's Iraq, which had a repressed Shiite majority and an ugly border dispute that precipitated a long war with Iran, Saudi Arabia is not in the type of strategic competition that would require going nuclear if Iran does. And Egypt will not go nuclear simply out of pride or envy. There are many barriers - economic, political, and technical - that prevent Saudi Arabia and Egypt from going nuclear. And if Israel's 30-year old arsenal has not pushed either of these countries over the nuclear edge so far, what is it exactly about Iran, a fellow muslim country, that would push them now?

The second proposition is much more familiar because it's been used before: middle eastern madmen cannot be deterred! Ross opines:

"with an Iranian president who sees himself as an instrument for accelerating the coming of the 12th Imam -- which is preceded in the mythology by the equivalent of Armageddon -- one should not take comfort in thinking that Iran will act responsibly"

This scare tactic, used so effectively in mobilizing opinion for the Iraq war, simply goes against all available facts. Those who use it would be hard-pressed to come up with examples of strategic, or even tactical, irrationality by the Iranians. What we do know is that Iran is a country with thousands of years of history and culture and that its president was popularly elected. We also know that the real power in Iran resides with the mullahs, who have proven quite capable of managing the country and holding on to power for the past 3 decades. We might not like the ideology of the Iranian government, but that doesn't mean they're suicidal madmen.

In my general defense of rapprochement with Iran, I have yet to discuss Iran's sponsorship of terrorist groups and its threat to Israel in detail. Stay tuned for a future part III.